Bank regulation and the process of internationalisation: a study of Japanese bank entry into London by Barry Howcroft (1254324) et al.
 
 
 
This item was submitted to Loughborough’s Institutional Repository 
(https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) by the author and is made available under the 
following Creative Commons Licence conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the full text of this licence, please go to: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
 
  
Bank regulation and the process of internationalisation: A study 
of Japanese bank entry  into London 
 
John Barry Howcrofta* , Rehan Ul-Haqb  and Richard Hammertonc 
 
aBusiness School, Loughborough University, Loughborough, LE11 2TU, UK; bBirmingham Business 
School, University of Birmingham, University House, Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK; 
cMichael Page Financial Services, 28th Floor, 1 Canada Square, London, E14 5AG, UK 
 
(Received 12 May 2008; final version received 8 September 2008) 
 
The paper provides a theoretical insight into bank regulation and the process of 
internationalisation by examining the concepts of regulatory push and market pull 
within the context of Japanese bank entry into London during the 1980s. Rugman and 
Verbeke’s  [(1998).  Corporate  strategy  and  international  environmental  policy. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 29(4), 819 – 833] Consistency of Home and 
Host Government Goals model is utilised to structure the discussion, which centres 
on a situation where there is a conflict of goals between multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) and the home government but goal alignment between MNEs and the host 
government. As such the paper examines a relatively under-researched aspect of 
internationalisation and concludes that in certain circumstances internationalisation 
can occur despite great ‘psychic distance’. The paper also argues that although bank 
regulation can lead to a conflict situation it can also be conducive to the development 
of a strong home base and the development of firm specific advantages. 
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Introduction 
Most research into the determinants of bank internationalisation have focussed on the USA 
as the host country (Budzeika, 1991; Grosse & Goldberg, 1991; Hultman & McGee, 1989) 
and others have examined the foreign activities of banks from one home country through- 
out the world (Buch & Lapp (1998) on German banks; Yamori (1998) on Japanese banks, 
and Moshirian & Van der Laan (1998) on German, UK, and US banks) but relatively few 
studies have focussed on the UK (Fisher & Molyneux, 1996) and none to our knowledge 
have focussed exclusively on Japanese banks entering the UK. 
Accordingly, this paper examines the entry of Japanese banks into the UK during the 
1980s. The period in question was chosen for a number of reasons but principally the 
1980s marked the end of an unprecedented period of deregulation within the UK, which 
commenced in the late 1960s with the full disclosure of bank profits and arguably culmi- 
nated with the so-called Big Bang in 1986 (Hall, 1987). The 1980s, therefore, represents 
the end of a lengthy period of deregulation which liberalised the competitive activities of 
banks in the UK. This was in stark contrast to the situation in Japan, where the financial 
services sector was highly regulated. Moreover, this period also witnessed a significant 
influx of Japanese banks into the City of London. For example, the Japanese banks 
 
 
 
 
doubled their total assets in the UK from 13.5% (£59,964 million) in 1980 to 26.6% 
(£241,683 million) in 1986. In the remaining part of the decade Japan’s market share 
declined slightly but at 22.9% (£281,992 million) in 1989, this still represented a significant 
overseas presence in the UK. 
In order to structure the discussion, the paper utilises Rugman and Verbeke’s (1998) 
analytical framework, which examines internationalisation through the interactions of 
multinational enterprises (MNEs), with home and host governments. Rugman and 
Verbeke’s (1998) conceptual framework was adopted because it builds upon and develops 
the neoclassical normative approach of Caves (1996) in a number of important respect. For 
example, it recognises that in the modern-day global economy the vast majority of country 
states have ‘open’ economies. Individual countries can, therefore, typically find them- 
selves acting as both home and host nations to MNEs and this consideration can sometimes 
make it difficult or even counter productive to introduce specific country level policies and 
regulations. Another important consideration in the adoption of Rugman and Verbeke’s 
model is the fact that it implicitly rejects the neoclassical environmental economist view- 
point that regulation can only act as a constraint on firms because it essentially detracts 
from profit maximisation. 
Instead, Rugman and Verbeke (1998) embrace the Porter and van der Linde (1995) 
argument that regulation can promote competitive enhancing change by forcing firms to 
adopt innovative solutions to problems present in their competitive and external environ- 
ment. In this respect, it follows that regulation as a key determinant of the external 
environment can be an important influence in the direction of innovation. However, 
Porter and van der Linde (1995) recognise that the form of regulation is important, and 
in  order  to  maximise  the  opportunities  for  innovation  they  advocate  that  regulation 
needs to be as flexible as possible. Accordingly, it is interesting to note that although 
regulatory controls in the Japanese banking sector were relatively restrictive they did 
not prevent Japanese banks from internationalising and responding to the market pull 
pressures presented by London’s more liberalised deregulated markets. 
Another consideration in adopting Rugman and Verbeke’s model was the fact that it 
embraces the resource-based theory of the firm and, therefore, goes a step further than 
Porter and van der Linde, who have a tendency to emphasise the primacy of the external 
environment over internal firm characteristics (Hilliard, 2004). Rugman and Verbeke, 
therefore, explicitly recognise that many large MNEs develop a diverse range of firm 
specific advantages (FSAs), which in some instances can be determined by the external 
environment.  The  response  to  regulation  and  innovation  opportunities  will  also  be 
largely influenced by these firm specific capabilities. Nevertheless, despite these consider- 
ations Rugman and Vebeke’s model does not fully take into account the effect that the 
external environment has on the decision to internationalise. 
Rugman and Verbeke’s framework consists of four quadrants, which incorporate 
various aspects of conflicting and complementing goal alignment between national 
governments and MNEs. Quadrant 3, which forms the focal point of the paper’s discus- 
sion, depicts the situation where MNE’s goals are in conflict with the home country but 
are complemented by the host country. Rugman and Verbeke (1998), however, claim 
that it is incorrect to assume that MNEs, which experience a conflict of goals with their 
home governments, will enter into host countries where goal complementarities are preva- 
lent. Accordingly, the authors of this paper, mindful of the dearth of academic literature on 
quadrant 3 and Buckley and Casson’s (1998) call for more critique of existing theory, 
argue that when ‘regulatory push’ and ‘market pull’ are in co-existence, Rugman and 
Verbeke’s (1998) assertion will not apply. 
 
 
The paper, therefore, focuses on quadrant 3 and provides greater insight into the 
process of internationalisation by examining Japanese bank’s entry into the UK during 
the 1980s. An understanding of the meaning of internationalisation is crucial to the discus- 
sion and the following definition by Ramachandran, Mukherji, and Sud (2006, p. 292) is 
adopted: ‘entering a new market that is geographically distinct from the home market. This 
is risky as the environment in a foreign country might pose unanticipated commercial and 
political challenges’. This definition is useful because it identifies the key themes of the 
paper, which inter alia incorporate the main differences between countries, the risks 
involved in entering different economic and political environments and the importance 
of good management to the long term success of MNEs. 
The paper is organised as follows: the next section consists of a literature review on 
internationalisation and the twin concepts of regulatory push and market pull. This is 
followed by an examination of the empirical research on regulation and other determinants 
of bank internationalisation. The next two sections outline the main regulatory and dereg- 
ulatory measures in Japan and London during the period under discussion. This latter 
section also discusses the origin and subsequent growth of the Eurocurrency market and 
the emergence of London as a financial centre. Rugman and Verbeke’s Consistency of 
Home and Host Government Goals model is then presented and the effects of regulatory 
push and market pull on bank internationalisation are then discussed within this frame- 
work. The conclusion identifies the main arguments of the paper, contrasts these argu- 
ments with the views and findings of other academics and provides some rational 
explanation for the arguments postulated in the paper. 
 
 
Internationalisation 
Internationalisation is a multifaceted process, which involves inter alia, behavioural, 
economic and political considerations. It seems reasonable, therefore, to take the attitude 
of regulators into account when examining the subject. Accordingly, academics, such as, 
Bauer (1994), Dunning (1997), and Weiss (2005), for example, have contended that regu- 
latory protectionism leads to internationalisation because it essentially constrains domestic 
competition and causes ‘regulatory push’, whereby firms seek more profitable opportu- 
nities in less regulated countries. Constraints on domestic competition are also generally 
regarded as promoting inefficiencies and some governments have, therefore, deregulated 
their national markets in an attempt to resolve economic problems and encourage growth 
and internationalisation (Chang, 2004; Sapienza, Autio, Geage, & Zahara, 2006). 
In contrast, Dunning (1997) and Kolte (2006) have argued that high levels of regu- 
lation can ‘condition firms’ and lead to the emergence of ‘leaner and fitter MNEs’, 
which are better able to penetrate global markets. Similarly, Cheney (2006) has shown 
how high levels of regulation in the US securities market has fostered efficient domestic 
financial institutions and reduced the entry of less efficient foreign firms. 
In order to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of why firms internationalise, 
it is also important to examine ‘market pull’. A fundamental tenet of market pull is that 
firms will  expand  into  foreign  countries  in  order  to  pursue  profitable opportunities 
(Bauer, 1994). As such, it is in accordance with Friedman’s (2007) argument that the 
actions of managers are constrained and dictated by shareholder’s desire for profit 
maximisation. Market pull is, therefore, predicated on the belief that firms are behavioural, 
self-interested actors that undertake strategic interactions with their environment (Rugman & 
Verbeke, 1998). Accordingly, Buckley and Casson (1998) and Anderson (1993), etc., 
have argued that efficiency and profit maximisation are principally determined by the 
 
 
actions of home and host governments, which shape the environment and, thereby, deter- 
mine the behaviour and propensity of firms to internationalise. 
The process of internationalisation, however, is only partly explained by the behav- 
ioural approach and a range of other factors need to be considered. For example, it has 
been argued that internationalisation is conducive to greater firm stability and increased 
profitability because it spreads risk over a broader spectrum of operational markets 
(Bauer, 1994). Other considerations include accessing new markets and having a presence 
in the so-called centres of excellence (Westney, 2006). It is also widely acknowledged that 
firms internationalise in order to acquire additional resources, particularly, in the form of 
knowledge and experience, which can then be transferred back to the home country 
(Anderson, 1993; Sapienza et al., 2006). Yang, Leone, and Alden (1992) adopt a slightly 
different approach and focus on internal constraints, especially, the attitude of manage- 
ment towards exporting and comparative advantages. Closely related to the behaviour 
of management is the strategic entrepreneurship approach, which emphasises the impor- 
tance of corporate culture, management competence, internal processes, and systems, to 
the process of internationalisation (Ramachandran et al., 2006). These sorts of consider- 
ations determine not only the willingness of managers to internationalise but also their 
ability in terms of planning and flexibility (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). Flexibility is regarded 
as important because it determines a firm’s so-called ‘fungibility’, i.e. its ability to transfer 
resources to alternative uses (Rugman & Verbeke, 1998), and its propensity to respond and 
survive (Buckley & Casson, 1998). 
Another explanation of why firms internationalise is provided by Caves’ (1982) 
Process Theory. In general terms, the theory states that firms make additional commit- 
ments in small incremental steps and, therefore, internationalisation can be regarded as 
an evolutionary process (Anderson, 1993; Channon & Jallan, 1979). The theory incorpor- 
ates the concept of ‘psychic distance’, which asserts that firms expand to neighbouring 
countries that are culturally, politically, and economically close to the home country 
(Westney, 2006). In instances where large psychic distance pervades, the risks associated 
with internationalisation increase proportionately and this leads firm to adopt a home 
country or regional focus (Ramachandran et al., 2006). However, as Westney (2006) 
points out, firms do not always fit neatly into the Process Theory. Similarly, Anderson 
(1993) believes that internationalisation models are vague and lack explanatory power 
as to how or why internationalisation takes place. 
 
 
Regulation  and other  determinants of bank internationalisation 
In order to ascertain the affect that government regulation has on the process of bank inter- 
nationalization, it is necessary to examine the empirical evidence (for a comprehensive 
coverage  of  this  literature,  see  Berger,  DeYoung, Genay,  &  Udell  (2000)).  In  this 
respect, it is useful to make a distinction between developed and developing countries. 
Evidence relating to developed countries is provided by Focarelli and Pozzolo (2000) 
whose study of 143 banks in 28 OECD countries found that government restrictions on 
domestic banks detracted from internationalisation. A possible explanation might be 
that government restrictions reduce the efficiency of banks and, thereby undermine their 
comparative advantages compared to competitors in host markets. This explanation is sup- 
ported by the findings of Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001, 2004) whose cross-country 
study revealed that restrictions placed on domestic banks adversely affected performance 
and stability. Similarly, many studies have found that foreign bank’s in the USA are less 
efficient than domestic banks because of the relatively high levels of regulation in their 
 
 
home markets (Chang, Hasan, & Hunter, 1998; De Young & Nolle, 1996; Hasan & 
Hunter, 1996; Mahajan, Rangan, & Zardkoohi, 1996). 
In contrast, recent cross-country studies that have examined the entry of foreign banks 
into developing countries have found that they are generally more efficient than domestic 
banks (Barajas, Steiner, & Salazar, 2000; Denizer, 2000). A possible explanation is pro- 
vided by Mathieson and Roldos (2001), who argue that the difference between the findings 
for developed and developing countries reflect differences in conditions at the time of 
foreign entry. For example, they contend that most studies of developed economies 
cover periods when banking controls have been liberalised for some considerable time. 
Accordingly, domestic banks have had time to get used to competing with other banks 
across a wide spectrum of financial activities. This competition typically places pressure 
on profit margins, which forces banks to reduce costs, diversify risks and seek alternative 
sources of revenue (Kumbakhar, Lozano-Vivas, Knox Lovell, & Hasan, 2001). 
Conversely, studies in developing economies have generally focused on periods when 
the banking system has only recently been liberalised or emerging from a crisis. In these 
instances, domestic banks have been protected from foreign bank entry and have experi- 
enced relatively low levels of competition from their domestic counterparts. Accordingly, 
protective measures detract from competition and protect inefficient banks. However, 
when markets are deregulated, significant profit making opportunities can arise, which 
attract  more  efficient  foreign  banks  from  developed  countries.  In  the  long  term, 
however,  some  studies  have  revealed  that  under  these circumstances  foreign  bank’s 
entry can improve the efficiency of domestic banks (see e.g. Barajas et al., 2000; Claessens, 
Demirguc-Kunt, & Huizinga, 2000; Denizer, 2000). 
There is, therefore, evidence to suggest that foreign banks invest in foreign countries to 
exploit profit opportunities and that this can bring about an increase in the overall 
efficiency of the financial system of the host country. However, in order to exploit 
profit-making opportunities it is imperative that banks look for countries with particular 
characteristics.  Accordingly,  Claessens  et  al.  (2000)  and  Yamori  (1998)  found  that 
foreign banks are attracted to countries with relatively low taxation and high per capita 
income. Focarelli and Pozzolo (2000) also found that foreign bank entry was higher in 
countries with relatively higher rates of economic growth. Similarly, there are some 
studies that link foreign bank entry to private foreign direct investment in the non-financial 
sectors (Ball & Tschoegl, 1982; Brealey & Kaplanis, 1996; Yamori, 1998). 
This latter evidence has been used to support the contention that there is a ‘pull’ factor 
and banks follow their customers abroad in order to retain business. However, although 
this is an undoubted factor in the internationalisation of banks, it has also been argued 
that foreign bank entry drives private foreign direct investment in non-financial sectors. 
For example, research by Seth, Nolle, and Mohanty (1998) into the lending patterns of 
US-based banks from Japan, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK, 
during the period 1981 – 1992, revealed that in the majority of instances loans were 
made to non-home country borrowers. Accordingly, they concluded that the ‘follow the 
customer’ hypothesis might not be as universally applicable as previously thought. 
Another explanatory reason for bank internationalisation revolves around the question 
of size. Tschoegl (1983), for example, examined the world’s largest banks in 1976 and 
found that there was a direct correlation between banks size and global spread. Grosse 
and Goldberg’s (1991) study of foreign banks in the USA in the 1980s, also established 
that there was a relationship between the sizes of the home country’s banking sector 
and internationalisation. A study by Ursacki and Vertinsky (1992), which examined 
foreign banks in Japan and Korea, Williams (1998), which focussed on foreign banks in 
 
 
Australia, similarly found a positive correlation between asset size and number of foreign 
branches. 
It could be argued that larger banks are more likely to have MNEs as customers and, 
are, therefore, more likely to be ‘pulled’ to new foreign locations. However, an equally 
compelling argument could be that banks with large home market shares might have 
greater ‘push’ incentives to seek risk diversification opportunities abroad. Similarly, 
benefits in the form of economies of scale might be associated with large-scale 
international banking (Vander Vennet, 1996). 
 
 
Regulation  of the Japanese banking  sector 
The regulatory regime in Japan prior to the 1980s was pervasive throughout the entire 
economy but no more so than in the financial services sector. For example, in the case 
of depository institutions restrictions were placed inter alia, on their sources and use of 
funds, the terms of their lending and borrowing activities, i.e. yield, maturity, minimum 
denominations  and  collateral  requirements,  etc;  the  size  of  their  branch  networks, 
merger activities and their stake holding in other companies. Similarly, restrictions on 
the Yen as an international currency ensured that the authorities maintained total control 
of the foreign exchange markets. Consequently, Japanese banks were not subject to free- 
market forces and, therefore, inefficient banks were protected, innovation was stifled 
and fees well in excess of international levels became the norm (Mora, 2005). 
In many respects, the Japanese banking system was historically similar to the UK’s, 
with the Bank of Japan being solely responsible for note issuance. Under the direction 
of the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the Bank of Japan typically used direct controls to 
control the economy and achieve its monetary policy objectives (Hall, 1993). However, 
this somewhat inflexible approach, which also existed in the UK prior to 1971, restricted 
competition and enterprise within the Japanese banking system. Nevertheless, despite the 
constraining effect of direct controls they continued well into the 1980s on the basis that 
they represented the best method for maintaining the stability of the Japanese financial 
system (Vogel, 1996). 
In addition to direct controls, the regulatory authorities also placed emphasis on moral 
suasion, statutory law and demarcation of the financial services markets: in essence, moral 
suasion is a form of administrative guidance (the so-called gyosei-shido) but it involved 
applying pressure rather than persuasion to obtain compliance from the banks. Tsutsui 
(1999), for example, commented that the MoF used moral suasion more than any other 
Japanese ministry and because it was the most powerful of all the Japanese ministries, 
it was in a position to impose sanctions for non-compliance (Williamson, 1995). Accord- 
ingly, Japanese corporations and banks in particular, regarded the ministry as a ‘straight 
jacket’, which restricted domestic economic growth. 
Interest rate regulations reduced the Japanese bank’s propensity to indulge in interest 
rate competition (Du¨ ser, 1990; Vogel, 1996). The main statutory instrument relating to 
interest rate control was the Temporary Interest Adjustment Law (TIRAL), which was 
implemented just after the Second World War. For almost 30 years, until it was eventually 
abolished in 1975 on anti-trust grounds, it regulated upper and lower limits on the interest 
rates private financial institutions could charge (Du¨ ser, 1990). A positive result of this 
regulation was that it helped to control inflation (Hall, 1993) and reduced the likelihood 
of bank failures (Mora, 2005). Hoshi and Kashyap (2001), however, argue that restrictions 
on price competition detracted from profit maximisation and banks attempted to alleviate 
this problem by increasing the size of their businesses. The Japanese regulatory authorities 
 
 
reacted by placing restrictions on financial institution’s ability to increase the size of their 
businesses and permission to expand branch networks, for example, had to be obtained 
from the MoF (Mora, 2005). Crucially, however, the regulation of Japanese interest 
rates was similar to Regulation Q in the USA, which together with other restrictive 
monetary policies resulted in American banks entering Europe and London in the 1960s 
(Einzig, 1970). Likewise in Japan, TIRAL eventually created regulatory push and was 
partially  responsible  for  significant levels  of  Japanese  bank  investment  in  London 
during the 1980s. 
The regulatory authorities were also responsible for the demarcation of the Japanese 
financial services industry and effectively determined the type of business that could be 
undertaken by financial institutions. As with the regulation of interest rates the demar- 
cation  of  the  financial  system  was  implemented  to  minimise  risk  but  it  similarly 
reduced competition and detracted from profit maximisation. The main method of demar- 
cation was the implementation of statutory laws. Accordingly, the Savings Bank Law 1921 
prohibited commercial banks from operating in the savings bank sector (Kuwayama & 
Hagan, 2000). Likewise, commercial banking was separated from securities business, 
and trust business was quite separate from deposit taking under the Loan Trust Law 
(1952). The loan Trust Law was generally perceived as being contrary to the interests 
of banks and created a dilemma which was succinctly captured by Vogel (1996, p.170): 
‘Japanese banks seek to act more like brokers and brokers seek to act more like bankers’. 
Article 65 of the Securities and Exchange Law (1948), which was drafted by the 
American occupation authority after the Second World War, had a particularly restrictive 
effect on Japanese financial markets. It was introduced to prevent Japanese banks creating 
powerful conglomerates because organisations such as the ‘Zaibatsu’, i.e. large family- 
owned banks and financial cliques were seen to be instrumental in financing Japan’s 
war effort (Morikawa, 1992). Indicative of this type of thinking was the Antimonopoly 
Law (1947), which also prevented financial institutions from having holdings in excess 
of 5% in other businesses (Hall, 1993). The Securities and Exchange Law also prohibited 
banks from both underwriting and dealing in securities with the exception of public bonds, 
which were closely regulated by administrative guidance. The separation of these func- 
tions greatly increased the cost associated with the issuance of debt in Japan and resulted 
in a significant part of this business being located outside Japan. 
The detrimental effect regulation had on the growth of the Japanese economy was 
exacerbated by the first oil price shock of 1973 (ul-Haq & Howcroft, 2007), which 
substantially increased the rate of inflation. This led to a marked deterioration in public 
sector finances and created pressure for reform of the primary government bond market 
to alleviate the funding burden on the banks as the main underwriters of public bond 
issues (Hall, 1993). The reaction of the corporate sector to the economic slowdown also 
had implications for the banking sector. For example, it reduced investment and this 
had a knock-on effect for the banks by reducing corporate borrowing. The corporate 
sector was also looking to consolidate their debts and reduce funding costs. Accordingly, 
they placed pressure on the authorities to provide them with greater access to domestic and 
international financial markets. Similarly, there was increased pressure to liberalise inter- 
est rates and generate real rates of return in the face of high levels of inflation (Vogel, 
1996). 
The banks themselves were eager for the authorities to liberate interest rates and take a 
more relaxed approach to demarcation so that they could compete more effectively in the 
market and diversify their activities. Pressure was also brought to bear on the Japanese 
authorities by foreign governments, particularly the USA, to introduce reciprocity in 
 
 
terms of market access and the use of the Yen as an international currency. Despite this 
pressure, it  took  some 14  years  before  the  Ministry  of  Finance  (1987)  published  a 
report setting out the plans for future reform. 
 
 
The Eurocurrency market and the emergence  of London as an international 
financial centre 
During the post-war period there emerged a global trend towards dismantling the pre-war 
controls on the movement of international capital (Roberts, 2001). This liberalisation of 
capital movements facilitated an unprecedented growth in international trade and one 
extremely important aspect of this liberalisation was the establishment of the Euromarkets 
centred in London (Moran, 1991). The primary reason as to why London emerged as the 
principal centre in the Euromarkets was due to a number of reasons. In the first instance a 
series of deregulatory changes, which occurred over a 20-odd year period eventually 
liberalised the financial markets in the UK. Arguably commencing in 1969 with the 
decision to disclose commercial bank profits, a period of systematic deregulation sub- 
sequently commenced. These deregulatory changes included inter alia: Competition and 
Credit Control (1971), a directive from the Bank of England (1984), which outlined how 
the banking system was to be controlled. As such, it effectively signalled the demise of 
the commercial bank’s cartel on interest rates and, thereby, created an environment in 
which market forces determined competition within the banking sector. 
In 1976 the passing of the Trustee Savings Bank Act and the Post Office (bank ser- 
vices) Act were the first steps in a series of measures designed to transform two public 
sector savings banks into highly competitive commercial banks operating in the private 
sector. This coincided with the elimination of official bias against bank lending and the 
abolition of higher purchase controls, thereby creating both the opportunity and the incen- 
tive for banks to compete aggressively in the consumer credit market. Subsequently, the 
so-called CORSET was abolished in 1980. This was a supplementary deposit levied by 
the authorities whenever certain liabilities increased above a pre-specified level. Accord- 
ingly, it made balance sheet growth beyond a certain level less profitable. The net effect of 
abolishing the CORSET was to provide banks with both the opportunity and the incentive 
to compete more effectively in the provision of loans, especially, in the house finance 
market (Howcroft, 1989). In 1986 radical changes to the London Stock Exchange were 
introduced. Known as the ‘Big bang’, these changes, amongst other thing, enabled com- 
mercial banks to increase their investment banking activities. As such, it eroded the tra- 
ditional demarcation lines between commercial and investment banking and heralded 
the emergence of so-called ‘universal banks’ (Hall, 1987). Finally, the last significant 
deregulatory change also occurred in 1986 with the passing of the Financial Services 
Act and the Building Societies Act. Inter alia, the former act introduced new supervisory 
arrangements based on self regulation with statutory backing and the latter allowed 
building societies, as mutual institutions, to convert into public limited companies. 
The liberalisation and ensuing increased competitiveness of Britain’s financial markets 
coincided with the emergence and growth of the Eurocurrency markets with London as the 
principal centre. The main currency was US dollars but the term ‘Eurocurrency’ refers to 
the deposit and loan of any convertible foreign currency by overseas residents, which 
attracts an international rate of interest. The most distinguishing feature of the Eurocur- 
rency markets, however, is that they are not subject to the same institutional controls 
and  regulations  associated  with  domestic  operations.  In  this  respect, therefore,  they 
have many of the attributes associated with ‘offshore’ centres (Kern, 1980). 
 
 
The origins of the Euromarkets are usually traced back to the gradual emergence of a 
market for US dollars in Europe during the 1950s (Heffernan, 1996; Lewis & Davis, 1987; 
Roberts, 2001). To a large extent this was because the US dollar eventually emerged as the 
World’s international reserve currency in the post-war period (Little, 1975; Makin, 1972). 
Consequently, the external demand for dollars by international investors, financial insti- 
tutions and governments was extremely high. The US government tried to counteract 
this demand and reduce the pressure on its balance of payments by implementing a restric- 
tive monetary policy. This included a withholding tax, introduced in 1963, on interest and 
dividends remitted abroad to overseas residents (the Interest Equalization Tax). Regu- 
lation Q was introduced in 1965 and imposed a ceiling on interest rates paid on deposits 
held in the USA. During that year, Voluntary credit Restraints was also introduced and 
effectively restricted the international lending activities of domestic banks (Duffey & 
Giddy, 1978; Einzig, 1970). The primary objective was to reduce the outflow of dollars 
from the USA but the net effect of these measures was to increase the propensity of 
foreign investors to deposit US dollars overseas. Moreover, US banks circumvented 
these restrictive measures by establishing overseas subsidiaries in Europe. Given its estab- 
lished, strong and innovative financial services sector, London provided an ideal market 
for this business (Machlup, 1970; Niehans & Hewson, 1976). 
These restrictions on the free flow of capital provided the initial major incentives for 
the emergence of the Eurocurrency market. However, when the USA removed these 
restrictions in 1974 the market was already established and the market continued to 
grow at an unprecedented rate. The main impetus for this second phase of growth came 
from the unprecedented oil price increases in 1974 and 1979 and the subsequent recycling 
of surplus funds by private banks to developing countries (ul-Haq & Howcroft, 2007). In 
essence, oil exporters received a massive increase in dollar-denominated funds from the 
export of oil and most of these funds were placed in bank deposits in the London Eurocur- 
rency market. Increases in the price of oil created significant balance of payments deficits 
in industrialised and developing countries, which were exacerbated by World recession. 
Accordingly, the bank’s traditional domestic markets went into decline just at the very 
time when new markets, in the form of international loans to finance balance of payments 
deficits in developing countries, were presenting themselves. As such, it marked the 
beginning of wholesale banking on a truly global or international scale. 
The emergence of the Eurocurrency market also coincided with post-war economic pol- 
icies aimed at free trade and the abolition of trade barriers. Consequently, at the very time 
when large corporations were beginning to expand their activities and become multina- 
tional, the banks were in a position to provide a truly global service. The combined effect 
of these changes had a significant market pull effect on banks from Japan and provided 
the opportunity for them to achieve their growth and profit objectives. As the Bank of 
England (1973, p. 185) noted at the time: ‘The expansion of international business has 
been accompanied by the development of world-wide banking networks, on a more 
sophisticated level than hitherto, to meet the needs of the biggest international companies’. 
 
 
Rugman  and Verbeke’s  consistency of home and host government  goals model 
The literature makes a distinction between two traditional models for explaining how 
MNEs organise and manage international operations, i.e. ethnocentric and polycentric 
models (Perlmutter, 1969). In essence, these models represent centralised and 
decentralised approaches, and the basic differences revolve around the primary organising 
principles and managements systems for establishing international operations (Bartlett & 
 
 
Goshal, 1989; Hedlund, 1986; Prahalad & Doz, 1987; White & Poynter, 1990). Rugman 
and Verbeke’s (1998) Consistency of Home and Host Government model has elements of 
both the ethnocentric and the polycentric approach and, therefore, provides a good basis to 
articulate the main arguments of the paper. In essence the model assumes that all matters 
are resolvable and, consequently, they consider the ‘micro’ aspects of the firm and place 
emphasis on the ability of managers to determine corporate actions. However, their theory 
does not fully take into account the effect that the external environment has on a firm’s 
decision to internationalise. Instead, internationalisation is regarded as a choice that 
firms make based upon the decisions, abilities and experience of managers. Ceteris 
paribus, it follows that the more international experience managers have the greater the 
propensity for firms to internationalise (Sapienza et al., 2006). 
Rugman and Verbeke’s (1998) recognises the fact that firms can be in ‘conflict’ with 
the external environment. In common with Caves (1982) and other neoclassical econom- 
ists this means that firms are not maximising profits. Similarly, the model assumes that 
firms, which successfully internationalise have a complementary or strong home base 
and, therefore, any potential conflict situation relates to the host country. Moreover, 
Rugman and Verbeke also posit that international firms have centralised and hierarchical 
organisational structures that facilitate the development of FSAs in the home country 
(Bartlett & Goshal, 1989). Accordingly, a further assumption is that when firms interna- 
tionalise they effectively replicate home country production processes and managerial 
structures/styles in the host country. 
Implicit in Rugman and Verbeke’s theory, therefore, is a resource-based view of the 
firm, which is regarded as being conducive to the development of FSAs that are capable 
of overcoming any conflict with the home country (Barney, 1991; Barney, Wright, & 
Ketchen, 2001; Penrose, 1959). Internationalisation is, accordingly, achieved through 
successfully transforming the firm from an ethnocentric to a polycentric organisation 
where FSAs are specific to the host country (Malnight, 1996). However, Child and Yan’s 
(2003) study of international joint ventures between Chinese and British companies has 
revealed that it is the ability of firms to learn and develop new FSAs outside the home 
country that resolves conflicts and facilitates internationalisation. 
To explain the dynamics of this firm-government interaction Rugman and Verbeke 
(1998) developed the framework shown in Figure 1. This framework is useful in explain- 
ing the situation where an MNE has to respond to a new environment in the host country. 
Accordingly, quadrant 1 depicts the Hymer (1976) quasi-Marxist Sovereignty at Bay view 
of a conflict of goals between the MNE and the governments in both the home and host 
countries. The focus is on distributional issues and the power of the MNE versus the 
host nation (Dunning & Rugman, 1985). As a prerequisite for internationalisation, this 
situation will require the MNE to establish FSAs that complement those of the home 
country government and then transform them into new FSAs in the host country (Child 
& Yan, 2003). As stated above, this process of internationalisation, therefore, involves 
the transformation of an organisation from an ethnocentric firm into a polycentric or 
geocentric firm (Perlmutter, 1969). 
The fourth quadrant is the polar position of quadrant 1 and is more consistent with 
Vernon (1966). Accordingly, it reveals a situation in which the goals of government 
and the MNE in both the home and host countries are complementary. It follows, 
therefore, that this is the ideal situation because it corresponds to Caves’ (1982) view 
of  a  centralised  and  hierarchical  MNE,  which  facilitates  an  ethnocentric  approach 
to  internationalisation.  Rugman  and  Verbeke  (1998,  p.124,)  accordingly  argue  that: 
‘Internationalisation grows via a product life cycle of technology in which intensive 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The consistency between MNE and Home and Host Government Goals. 
Source: Rugman and Verbeke (1998). 
 
 
FSAs developed initially in a strong home base, are produced by wholly owned subsidi- 
aries in host countries’. 
Quadrant 3 depicts the more complex situation of a conflict of goals between the home 
government and the MNE but in contrast to quadrant 1, the MNEs goals complement 
those of the host countries’ government. There has been less research on this situation 
but it generally refutes the political science-led rationale for this quadrant (Eden, 1985). 
Accordingly, there is little or no evidence to suggest that the rationale for this quadrant 
is based on systematic transfer pricing other than as a response to effective tax rate 
differentials and other exogenous market imperfections. Rugman and Verbeke (1998), 
therefore, once again follow the view of Caves (1982) and argue that this situation is 
not readily conducive to internationalisation because the MNE does not have a strong 
home base to overcome conflicts. Moreover, they state that (p. 126): ‘It would be incorrect 
to assume that MNEs, faced with excessive goal conflicts in their home countries, seek 
co-operation with . . .. host nations, where goal complementarity is prevailing’. 
In contrast, quadrant 2 depicts an equally complicated situation where the home 
government and the MNEs goals are complementary but there is a conflict between the 
goals of the MNE and the host government. As such, it is broadly representative of 
Porter (1990) and the larger literature on strategic trade policy (Tyson, 1993; Yoffie, 
1993). In this situation, the MNE is in a good position to internationalise by re-creating 
home country FSAs in the host country and becoming a polycentric or geocentric organ- 
isation. However, Rugman and Verbeke (1998) qualify this oversimplified view by claim- 
ing that governments do not have the necessary knowledge and internal infrastructures to 
facilitate the internationalisation of domestic firms. 
 
 
Regulatory push and market pull 
As mentioned earlier, Rugman and Verbeke’s (1998) framework is built on the assump- 
tions that firms have a strong home base and that all conflicts are resolvable. However, 
 
 
this assumption might not hold in all situations. For example, in quadrant 3, which depicts 
conflict in the home country but complementary goal alignment in the host country, there 
is a distinct possibility that the conflict with the home government might be irresolvable. 
This situation could occur with banks and other financial institutions, which form a unique 
and integral part of the economy. Accordingly, governments might apply restrictions on 
the activities of banks, in order to control inflation and implement monetary policy. As 
a direct consequence, banks might internationalise and move into more liberal financial 
markets in order to increase profitability. Under these circumstances a combination of 
regulatory push, i.e. a situation where regulation or a change in regulation constrains 
the operations of a firm, and market pull, i.e. a situation where a firm is drawn to a 
market because of the opportunity to increase profitability, might induce a bank to inter- 
nationalise before conflicts with the home country are resolved. However, this does not 
necessarily preclude a firm from having introduced innovations to adapt better to the exter- 
nal environment and thereby create FSAs that are conducive to reducing conflicts in the 
home country prior to internationalisation. Accordingly, management will have learned 
from their experiences in the home country and might introduce these new FSAs in the 
host country as part of operational learning (Child & Yan, 2003). 
Figure 2 encapsulates the situation described above by revealing the potential 
responses of a firm to its external environment. In accordance with Rugman and Verbeke’s 
(1998) theory, the bottom left corner depicts a situation where a firm can operate unhin- 
dered by regulation and there is little or no incentive to internationalise. The opposite 
situation and one which is more difficult to reconcile to Rugman and Verbeke’s theory 
is revealed by the top right-hand corner. Accordingly, this paper contends that when regu- 
latory push and market pull are present, it can be regarded as perfectly rational for firms, 
such as banks, to seek more profitable opportunities in host countries (Weiss, 2005). 
The basis for this contention stems from the fact that it is the primary responsibility of 
management to create wealth and maximise profitability (Friedman, 2007). In this respect, 
free or liberalised markets allow managers to maximise profitability without political 
interference  or  restriction.  Moreover,  such  a  response  is  entirely  compatible  with 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Internationalisation as a response to changes in regulation. 
Source: Authors. 
 
 
Rugman and Verbeke’s (1998) behavioural model, which takes an efficiency view of the 
firm and accordingly implies that organisations should always maximise profits. Similarly, 
Bauer (1994) argues that global diversification allows a firm to stabilise and increase its 
profits by broadening its markets and spreading risk. In this respect, the model of regulat- 
ory push and market pull allows a firm to pursue its primary goal of profit maximisation 
and, thereby, meet the key internationalising elements identified by Sapienza et al. (2006) 
of achieving growth and survival. 
The model of regulatory push and market pull does not, however, conform to Caves’ 
(1982) Process Theory, which states that firms internationalise and move into countries 
with a close ‘psychic distance’. This non-conformity with Process Theory is clearly 
evidenced by the internationalisation of Japanese banks and their entry into the UK in the 
1980s. The deregulated financial services markets in the UK were the exact polar of 
Japan’s highly regulated markets and, therefore, there was a substantial psychic distance 
between the two countries. Moreover, this was arguably the single most important consider- 
ation in the decision of Japanese banks to internationalise because it provided them with 
the opportunity to compete in a free market and increase profits. In addition to the different 
approaches to regulation, the psychic distance between Japan and the UK was also com- 
pounded by their totally different cultural, political and economic regimes (Westney, 2006). 
 
 
Conclusion 
The paper has argued that the twin forces of regulatory push and market pull were largely 
responsible for the internationalisation of Japanese banks into London. Japan’s highly regulated 
financial services markets were in stark contrast to London and the Eurocurrency markets 
liberal regimes (Tsutsui, 1999). The controls on interest rates (Du¨ ser, 1990), the demarcation 
of the financial service markets (Vogel, 1996) and the regulations placed on the Yen as an 
international currency (Du¨ ser, 1990) constrained the Japanese banking industry and created 
regulatory push in the form of a desire to pursue more profitable international opportunities. 
Japan’s regulatory regime combined with protectionist policies, which effectively precluded 
foreign bank entry, nevertheless, allowed the Japanese banks to develop FSAs in the home 
market. In this respect the paper is in total agreement with view of Caves (1982) and 
Rugman and Verbeke (1998). However, in contrast to these authors the paper has argued 
that this created regulatory push and led to the internationalisation of Japanese banks. 
Simultaneously and in direct contrast to the situation in Japan, deregulation in the UK, 
which inter alia included Competition and Credit Control (Bank of England,1984), the 
abolition of the CORSET, the passing of the Financial Services Act (Howcroft, 1989) 
and the so-called ‘Big Bang’ (Hall, 1987), created a liberalised financial services sector. 
These deregulatory developments coincided with the emergence and unprecedented 
growth of the Eurocurrency market with its principal centre in London. Moreover, its emer- 
gence as an international market was so dramatic that the central authorities had no real time 
to consider how to control it and, therefore, it was essentially unregulated (Kern, 1980). 
Accordingly, the emergence of liberalised financial services markets in the UK combined 
with the spectacular growth of the Eurocurrency markets centred in London created market 
pull and attracted Japanese banks in search of growth and increased profitability. 
The Eurocurrency markets were the principal means for recycling petro-dollars and 
financing the balance of payments deficits created by the increase in the price of oil 
during the 1970s. However, when the problems with debt repayment started to emerge 
in the late 1970s, it became clear that the Latin American debt crisis was imminent 
(United Nations,  1991). In this respect, some authors have found that financial and 
 
 
economic crises can present foreign banks with growth opportunities (see e.g. Detragiache 
& Gupta, 2006; Peek & Rosengren, 2000). It was, therefore, perhaps no coincidence that 
the internationalisation of Japanese banks was most marked in the 1980s. 
Somewhat significantly, the Japanese banks had not been drawn into the Latin Amer- 
ican debt crisis and to some extent this was because of the regulations and controls 
imposed by their home government. High levels of regulation, therefore, provided the 
Japanese banks with a relatively strong base and allowed them to develop FSAs, 
especially, hierarchical management structures and a reputation for disciplined manage- 
ment,  which  facilitated  the  internationalisation  process.  In  this  respect,  the  paper 
concurs with the findings of Dunning (1997), Kolte (2006), and Cheney (2006), etc, 
who have found that high levels of regulation can increase efficiency and lead to interna- 
tionalisation. The paper, however, does not fit well with Caves’ (1982) Process Theory 
because  internationalisation  occurred  despite  significant  ‘psychic  distance’  between 
Japan and London. Similarly, in contrast to Rugman and Verbeke (1998) the FSAs devel- 
oped by Japanese banks were not sufficient to overcome conflict with the home 
government. Moreover, although there was a conflict with the home country government 
this did not result in Japanese banks leaving Japan. Instead the internationalisation process 
was undertaken while simultaneously remaining in the home country and working to 
reduce governmental conflict (Ministry of Finance, 1987). 
The liberalised regime in London and the timing of their internationalisation also 
allowed the Japanese banks to establish themselves as investment bankers rather than com- 
mercial banks. This was because the Latin American debt crisis heralded the decline of 
traditional deposit and lending activities associated with commercial banks and an 
increase  in  the  sort  of  capital  and  securities  activities  associated  with  investment 
banking. Accordingly, the Japanese banks became major players in the various securities 
markets in London. This final consideration raises two further points: although regulatory 
push and market pull were undoubtedly important determinants of Japanese banks 
internationalisation, the uniqueness of the timing was also an important consideration. 
Moreover, although the Japanese did replicate some home country FSAs in London, 
especially those relating to management style and structures, they also had to develop 
new FSAs in order to compete as investment banks (Child & Yan, 2003). 
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